New demands also soften restrictions on investment in artificial intelligence and deals with ad competitors.

The Department of Justice and 39 state attorneys general have revised proposed remedies they say will restore competition in the internet search engine market dominated by Google via an “illegal monopoly,” as they successfully alleged in a pair of antitrust suits filed in 2020. Judge Amit P. Mehta ruled in favor of the government attorneys in August 2024 (U.S. v. Google, 1:20-cv-03010-APM, D.D.C.; Colorado v. Google, 1:20-cv-03715-APM, D.D.C.).

The remedy with perhaps the greatest immediate impact would be the divestiture of Chrome. As of March 2025, the browser had a 53% share of the U.S. internet browser market, while Apple’s Safari accounts for 30%. Globally, Chrome holds 66% and Safari holds 18%. Source: Stat Counter Global Stats.

In November 2024, in addition to calling for Google to spin off Chrome, the government attorneys wanted Google to:

• Divest Android if the other remedies are not effective.
• End exclusionary agreements with original equipment makers, e.g., Apple and Samsung, which make Chrome their default browser.
• End self-preferencing practices favoring Android, YouTube, and Gemini.
• Stop making search-related payments to search distribution partners.
• Divest or halt investment in AI companies and otherwise use its power to gain greater influence over that developing industry.
• Share with rivals massive troves of data, which is critical to restoring competition.
• Increase transparency and control for advertisers.
• Limit “qualified competitors” (those able to compete with Google) to syndicating 25% or less of their search text ads from Google.
• Immediately price search text ads syndicated to qualified competitors at marginal cost.

Citing further examination of remedies and potential “unintended consequences,” the government attorneys reaffirmed many of the demands from November, but they no longer wish to force Google to:

• Divest its AI investments, asking instead that the company provide prior notification of any deals or investments in AI companies.
• Stop making payments to Apple if those payments are unrelated to search.
• Limit qualified competitors to syndicating 25 percent or less of their search text ads from the company, shifting focus to “parity, transparency, and control to qualified competitors syndicating search text ads from Google.”
• Immediately price search text ads syndicated to qualified competitors at marginal cost. Instead, the demand is contingent on other proposed remedies not working.

Google favors behaviorial remedies and allowing the government to monitor its conduct. It has suggested more stringent oversight by regulatory authorities to ensure compliance with antitrust laws. It has offered to provide regular reports to a technical committee to ensure transparency in its operations, particularly regarding search text ads auctions. It has expressed its willingness to limit or modify its exclusive agreements with device manufacturers and other partners to reduce its competitive advantage.

The company has said such remedies would address the antitrust concerns without requiring the company to divest Chrome, which Google argues would harm consumers and undermine its technological leadership.

Antitrust Is Enforcement, Not Regulation

Is the structural remedy, i.e., spinning off Chrome, favorable to the behavioral remedies Google prefers and like some of those proposed by the government plaintiffs? In deciding between the two approaches courts must assess, among other factors, the likelihood that a remedy will successfully restore competition.

Antitrust is enforcement; it is not regulation. This cannot be emphasized enough. The purpose of antitrust is to support market outcomes, and remedies are used to restore the competitive status quo. Antitrust theory has traditionally preferred structural remedies because they do not require constant monitoring and intervention by antitrust enforcers as if they were regulators and cedes power to market participants who can then operate without the prior competitive barrier.

If Chrome is split from Google, behavioral remedies, such as barring deals with OEMs, would become moot. The details of any divestiture would need court approval, and that approval would come with conditions. Barring exclusive distribution through OEMs, for example, should be on the table.

The remedies also acknowledge the tech Goliath’s place in the vanguard of the AI tech wave. AI is rapidly changing how we consume, analyze, and leverage data in business, in the practice of law, and as individuals. Statista Market Insights predicts the global AI industry itself – such as software and hardware companies – will generate $827 billion in revenue by 2030. That does not count the revenue and savings companies will realize from the use of these technologies.

Limiting Google’s investment in that space would be significant. DOJ’s request that Google provide notice of any investment in or purchase of AI companies – regardless of size – is not an uncommon remedy, however. Following its acquisition of Ticketmaster, Live Nation was required by consent decree in 2010 to notify the federal government of any deals in the live entertainment and ticketing market. By all metrics, that consent decree has not delivered. Live Nation faces both public and private litigation for not changing its anticompetitive ways. In the 1990s, Microsoft was barred from making any purchases of software businesses. The software giant got away with behavioral changes like those Google desires. Remedies in the Microsoft case had very little impact on the operating system market.

Whatever the final remedies package looks like in this case, it is important that antitrust enforcers remain just that – enforcers – and not regulators, tasked like so many hall monitors put in place to ensure companies are behaving.